Akira · Threat actors

The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified.

It posted 557 listings in the last 12 months; the busiest month was March 2026 (75 listings).

The group is associated with 2 malware families.

Also known as: PUNK SPIDER, GOLD SAHARA

Most targeted country: United States, with 898 listings (52% of the total).

Most targeted sector: Manufacturing, with 466 listings (27% of the total).

Targeted countries

Targeted sectors

VictimBoyle, Pecharich, Cline, Whittington andStallingsSectorProfessional ServicesListedNov 6, 2026

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36 MITRE ATT&CK techniques across 14 stages are documented in the group's attacks.

1
Initial access
The attacker gets into the corporate network for the first time.
T1078Valid AccountsT1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain AccountsT1133External Remote ServicesT1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
2
Execution
Malicious code runs on the target system.
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationT1059Command and Scripting InterpreterT1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShellT1059.002System Services: Service ExecutionT1059.003Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
3
Persistence
Access survives reboots and password changes.
T1136.001Create Account: Local AccountT1136.002Create Account: Domain Account
4
Privilege escalation
The attacker moves to accounts with higher privileges.
T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain AccountsTA0004Privilege Escalation
5
Defense evasion
Security software and logging are bypassed.
T1112Modify RegistryT1562.001Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
6
Credential access
Passwords, tokens and session data are stolen.
T1003.001OS Credential Dumping: LSASS MemoryT1558Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
7
Discovery
Systems, accounts and data on the network are mapped.
T1018Remote System DiscoveryT1082System Information DiscoveryT1482Domain Trust DiscoveryTA0007Discovery
8
Lateral movement
The attacker moves to other systems inside the network.
T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop ProtocolT1570Lateral Tool Transfer
9
Collection
Data to be stolen is selected and gathered.
T1213.002Data from Information Repositories: SharepointT1560.001Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
10
Command and control
Compromised systems are controlled remotely.
T1219Remote Access ToolsT1229Remote Access Software
11
Exfiltration
Data is moved out of the organization; the threat to publish it in the listing relies on this data.
T1048.003Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolT1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
12
Impact
Systems are encrypted or services are stopped.
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactT1490Inhibit System RecoveryT1531Account Access RemovalT1657Financial Theft
13
Other techniques
T1027.001Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary PaddingT1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationT1685Disable or Modify Tools

The group is associated with 2 malware families.

Malware families

Akira (Linux)
Akira (Windows)

Published reports on this actor:

Source: MISP Galaxy, Malpedia.

What does a ransomware group do?

Ransomware groups break into corporate networks, move data out and encrypt systems. If the ransom is not paid, they list the organization on a leak site and threaten to publish the data.

How does Akira get into organizations?

The attacker gets into the corporate network for the first time.

T1078 · Valid Accounts
T1078.002 · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
T1133 · External Remote Services
T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing Application

Which defenses matter most?

Priority defenses based on the documented techniques:

Keep internet-facing VPN, remote desktop and firewall interfaces patched, and require multi-factor authentication on these accounts.
Allow scripts and macros only for users who need them, and keep behavioral rules enabled in endpoint protection.
Monitor newly created services, scheduled tasks and startup entries.
Reduce local administrator accounts and perform privileged tasks from separate, monitored accounts.
Alert when security software is disabled or logs are cleared.
Regularly check whether employee passwords and session cookies appear in infostealer logs.
Monitor accounts that run many queries in a short time and unusual network scans.
Segment the network and expose management protocols only on the management network.
Monitor large file archiving operations.
Block unapproved use of remote management tools.
Monitor unusual data volumes sent to cloud storage and file transfer services.
Keep offline, immutable backups and test restores regularly.

What should you do if your organization is listed on a leak site?

Record the listing and any published sample files; do not visit the leak site from the corporate network.
Isolate affected systems and preserve logs without deleting them.
Determine which data left the organization; if personal data is involved, review notification obligations with your legal team.
Make any decision about the ransom demand together with legal, management and incident response.
Do not bring systems back online before the attacker’s entry point is closed.

Is your organization mentioned?

Search with your domain to check whether your organization appears in ransomware listings, leaked records, forums and Telegram channels.

Search your domain

Targeted countries

Targeted sectors

Initial access

Execution

Persistence

Privilege escalation

Defense evasion

Credential access

Discovery

Lateral movement

Collection

Command and control

Exfiltration

Impact

Other techniques

Malware families

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