CVE-2020-16630
Description
TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission.
How to fix
Sources list no fixed version or patch link for this vulnerability.
Affected products
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| ti 15.4-stack | No range specified | — |
| ti ble5-stack | No range specified | — |
| ti dynamic_multi-protocal_manager | No range specified | — |
| ti easylink | No range specified | — |
| ti openthread | No range specified | — |
| ti z-stack | No range specified | — |
| ti real-time_operating_system | No range specified | — |
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