CVE-2026-32747
Description
SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the globalCopyFiles API eads source files using filepath.Abs() with no workspace boundary check, relying solely on util.IsSensitivePath() whose blocklist omits /proc/, /run/secrets/, and home directory dotfiles. An admin can copy /proc/1/environ or Docker secrets into the workspace and read them via the standard file API. An admin can exfiltrate any file readable by the SiYuan process that falls outside the incomplete blocklist. In containerized deployments this includes all injected secrets and environment variables - a common pattern for passing credentials to containers. The exfiltrated files are then accessible via the standard workspace file API and persist until manually deleted. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.
How to fix
- b3log siyuan3.6.1 or later
Affected products
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| b3log siyuan | v < 3.6.1 | 3.6.1 |
| github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernelGo | v ≤ 0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3, No range specified | — |
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