CVE-2026-52940

Medium

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tun: zero the whole vnet header in tun_put_user() tun_put_user() declares an on-stack struct virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash_tunnel without zeroing it. For a non-tunnel skb, virtio_net_hdr_tnl_from_skb() only initializes the first 10 bytes (sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr)), leaving bytes 10..23 (num_buffers and the hash/tunnel fields) as stack garbage. An unprivileged user can set the vnet header size to 24 with TUNSETVNETHDRSZ, so __tun_vnet_hdr_put() copies all 24 bytes of the partially-initialized struct to userspace, leaking 14 bytes of kernel stack on every read of a non-tunnel packet. Fix it the same way tun_get_user() already does by zeroing the whole header right after declaration.

SeverityMedium
CVSS5.5
Exploit probability—
ProductLinux Kernel
PublishedJun 24, 2026
First seenJun 24, 2026

How to fix

Update
  • linux linux_kernel6.18.36, 7.0.13 or later

Affected products

ProductAffected versionsFixed in
linux linux_kernel6.17 ≤ v < 6.18.36, 6.19 ≤ v < 7.0.13, 7.16.18.36, 7.0.13

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