CVE-2026-80811

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/cmd: fix iovec leak when the async cmd is not recycled An io_async_cmd carries an iovec array in ->vec.iovec, allocated when the vec has to grow and kept across recycling through ctx->cmd_cache. On two paths nothing frees it and io_clean_op()'s kfree(req->async_data) drops the io_async_cmd without it. io_req_uring_cleanup() clears the async data flags only when io_alloc_cache_put() succeeds, and the cache holds IO_ALLOC_CACHE_MAX == 128 entries, so once it is full the put fails and the vec is left behind. An NVMe passthrough workload gets there without doing anything unusual: nvme_uring_cmd_io() returns -EIOCBQUEUED, so the io_async_cmd stays attached for the lifetime of the command and the live object count tracks the queue depth. Above 128 the puts start failing. ->cleanup is the last chance to free an inherited vec, since io_req_uring_cleanup() returns early for an io-wq issued command and is not called at all for one completed without ever being issued. But io_clean_op() calls ->cleanup only if REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP is set, and for uring_cmd that happens only where the vec has to grow, so a command reusing a large enough cached vec never sets it. io_rw_alloc_async() and io_msg_alloc_async() flag an inherited vec for exactly this reason; io_uring_cmd_prep() does not. Flag an inherited vec in io_uring_cmd_prep(), and free the vec when the cache put fails, as io_req_rw_cleanup() does. The leak is invisible under KASAN, where io_alloc_cache_vec_kasan() frees the vec unconditionally.